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i. INTRODUCTION  
 In the early 1970’s, Malaysian second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, launched what is 
known as the New Economic Policy3, to correct racial economic imbalances and restructuring the 
Malaysian society ; no economic sector would in future be identified along racial lines.  One major 
political concern at that time, was that only a miniscule proportion, 1.4 %, of the Malaysian corporate 
wealth was in the hands of the Malays.  Hence it was planned that by the year 1992, the Malays would 
control 30 % of the corporate wealth.  Tun Abdul Razak’s grand plan was to initiate this growth from 
below, through the mobilization of capital, both financial and human capital, and the opening of new 
lands in response to the increasing world demand for edible oils, rubber and other food commodities.  At 
the same time he incrementally launched an import-substitution industrialization program particularly in 
sectors where local raw materials like rubber and palm oil were exploited to increase values of these 
globally demanded commodities.  The 30 % Malay equity was calculated from the strategies built into 
the Plan.  It was not an arbitrary figure.   
 When Tun Razak died in 1976, the Plan was slowly put aside in favour of a more robust 
industrialization program.  The controlled pace of growth and development from below particularly 
through the cooperative movement, became stunted due to the lack of budgetary aid, and the plan for 
the empowerment of the cooperatives in the market place was replaced by theprivatization policy4. 
 It was during the early 1980’s that petroleum came to the fore as a major contributor to 
Malaysian economic wealth.  This spurned further the drive to jump headlong into infrastructures and 
heavy industries such as iron and steel as well as motor car and motor-cycle manufacturing.  Coupled 
with political-economic strategy of national ownership of primary and secondary resources, the 
government launched efforts towards controlling the secondary and tertiary markets, which was still 
controlled by foreign interests in order to attain a functional market integration in its industrialization 
strategy.  Thus a big portion of the petro-ringgit was spent towards realizing the industrialization goals, 
bypassing parliamentary scrutinization, in what is called off-budget spending. 
 The resultant economic growth in Malaysia from 1980’s and 1990’s was spectacular, going 
above 7 % per annum.  However in 1992, Tun Razak’s goal of achieving 30 % of corporate equity for the 
Malays only managed to reach 19 % and today in the year 2014, after 43 years it onlyhovers around 22 
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%.  In the meantime, the distribution of national wealth never dipped below the Gini Coefficient of 
0.40throughout this high growth period.  Today in 2014, Malaysian Gini Coefficient hovers around 0.431, 
the highest in           
 the Asian region5.  Thus the goal of eradicating poverty which is closely identified with the 
Malay race that Tun Razak dreamt of, has not been achieved despite the increased national wealth.  
Today this poverty is also shared by the other racial minorities of Malaysia, the Chinese and the Indians, 
if the Gini-Coefficient of 0.431 is to be taken as the indicator. 
 This paradox of the masses being poor in a universe of increasing national wealth can be 
traced to centuries of the Malay world’s history of how wealth administration and management 
favoured a few, while marginalizing the majority.  This paper attempts to show that during periods of 
immense increase in national wealth, Malay rulers throughout history became too engrossed with non-
productive activities and living leisurely and enjoying hedonistic lives;to enable this they farmed out to 
selected individuals, particularly foreigners, the back-breaking job of management and administration of 
the economies.  Concessions were freely distributed to foreigners, thus marginalizing many of the local 
elites as well as the masses, resulting in mass poverty, banditries and piracies.  It was during the 
economic booms of the Srivijaya, and to large extent the Majapahit and Malacca empires that piracies 
proliferated.  And it was also during these booms that the empires fell.  The Malays, including their 
elites, joined the ever lurking Chinese(Hakka) and Viet pirates who once monopolised the piratical 
profession in the South China Sea.  
 This paper examines the paradox of national wealth that triggered the downfall of regimes in 
the Malay world as a whole.  The thesis that Malay bureaucracy’s decadence being really a major factor 
in Malay political and economic demise, constitute the central dimension of this analysis.   
 
ii.  THE HISTORY OF MALAY NATION-BULDING ------- A Political - Economy of   Growth and 
Development 
 Whether the Malays originated from China or from Borneo-Sumatra (as a new local-genius 
hypothesis being insisted by a group of social scientists from the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)6, is 
irrelevant to the history of their seafaring wanderings which enabled them to colonise the Southeast 
Asian Archipelago, consisting of thousands of big and tiny landmasses, and also islands whichspread 
across oceans from Taiwan to the South Pacific and Madagascar.  These maritime wanderings which 
began 5500 years ago was triggered by a dominant element in their Austronesian ancestors’ mythology 
which glorifies the seeking of bounties beyond the horizon.  Many of the present Malay tribes still 
harbour this romantic economic urge, particularly the Minangkabaus with their merantau institutions.  
 The early form of small settlements, individually led by a ‘datuk’ were supported by 
economic substructural bases of fishing and subsistence farming mostly at estuaries and along valleys of 
major rivers of Southeast Asian land masses.  Societal egalitarian values in both economic and social 
activities were upheld, as exemplified by the ancient proverbs “hati gajah sama dilapah, hati kuman 
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sama dicicah” and “berat sama dipikul, ringan sama dijinjing” and “gunung sama didaki, lurah sama 
dituruni”. Other proverbial sayings reflect Malay values and norms.  
 In time, these settlements or ‘kedatuan’ grew bigger into what are called ‘mandala’, a 
designation of a pre-state body of settlers occupying a geographical space7.  The spread of mandalas in 
the Southeast Asian Archipelago as result of waves after waves of migration came to a standstill in the 
early years of the Christian era i.e about two thousand years ago8.  Trades and wars between the 
mandalas predominated inthe earlyquest to control both territories as well as economic resources and 
markets.  Society remained egalitarian and homogenous.  Early contacts with outsiders were limited to 
sporadic transactions with a powerful kingdom called Funan situated in the Mekong River Delta of 
Cambodia, prior to the end of the 5th Century A.D.  At the same time contacts with Indian Civilization 
occurred between mandalas at the northern region of the Malay Peninsular.  Thus, as trade proliferated, 
the early northern peninsular mandalas of Tambralingga or Pan-Pan and Pattani or Langkasuka at the 
Gulf of Siam with Takuapa and Kedah at the Andaman Sea developed into states.  Society began to be 
differentiated by necessities of specialization in day-to-day living, responding to economic growth and 
diversification.  
 The above process of state-formation on each side of the northern peninsular actually 
started five centuries before the Christian era9 when Pan-Pan or Tambralingga(Nakhonsithamarat) on 
the eastern coast of the peninsular became the collection points for trade goods from Funan.  Chinese 
traders dumped their goods at Funan to be transhipped to these two Malay states.  From there they 
were taken by land to Kedah (Lembah Bujang) where they were shipped to India.  Thus Kedah prospered 
as the western port of Langkasuka, the administrative center being situated at Yarang, fourteen 
kilometres southeast of the present city of Pattani.  The same development process occurred in the 
north i.e the Tambralingga region.  In the same way Indian goods were transferred from Kedah and 
Takuapa to Funan to be traded with the Chinese.  
 The elites, including the datuks and rajas were involved directly with trading activities.  Most 
of the time they themselves led trade missions to India and Funan.  
 During these early state formative periods in the Northern Malay World, the Chinese had yet 
to discover the use of Malay forest products like camphor and other benzoic latex.  Their trading forays 
mostly stopped at Funan where minor Malay forest products brought by Malay traders from all over the 
archipelago were exchanged with Chinese products.  The critical mass of trade to support a state 
structure was yet to be achieved.  Thus the mandalas in the southern regions of the Malay Peninsular, 
South East Sumatra, Java and the rest of the Malay World could not reach the status of states yet.  They 
remained small, homogenous settlements governed by datuks adhering to the values of egalitarianism 
and practising animistic beliefs. 
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 The developed northern states of Langkasuka and Tambralingga prospered in the primordial 
East-West trade resulting in societal stratifications where a raja or king ruled over strata of datuks, 
palace officials, bureaucrats, soldiers, merchants, ordinary folks and slaves.  Thus a stratified political 
system was formed and political institutions emerged.  Bureaucratic posts of bendahara (prime 
minister), temenggung (head of police and military), laksamana (admiralty) and so forth were instituted.  
A standing police and army unit was formed to maintain law and order.  Rules and regulations appeared 
particularly in areas of successions to the throne as well as important state posts to regulate the 
economicand social sectors.  Thus a dynastical structure was formed, with most of these posts being 
filled by family members of the raja. 
 The political system instituted tax-collections on trade and other sectors of the economy.  
Areas of influence and control were demarcated by physical boundaries such as rivers, hills and forests.  
Thus the newly formed state extraction power became well defined and developed as the economy 
grew.  
 Most of the state’s extractive incomes were derived from trading activities both from riverine 
and maritime trades.  Very little income would be derived from usufructoryexploitation of agricultural 
land because the Malays of that early period did not venture much into agricultural sector.  They 
preferred the sea and ocean for their livelihood.  Whatever agricultural activities pursued were for 
subsistence purposes. 
  State income were shared among members of the polity and the expanding bureaucracy 
in sliding scale where the king was given the most-share and the lowest state officials the least.  In 
exchange to the governed,the state apparatus provided security and built economic infrastructures to 
develop the economy further. 
 Income from extractive sectors enjoyed by members of the polity and from their own 
commercial undertakings further complicated the social stratification process.  Pre-class groups 
appeared as a result of differential possession of wealth followed by the development of new social 
values and norms.  It should be remembered that all the early development of political and social 
structure through the centuries occurred among the Malays themselves without any external influences.  
Whatever income and wealth enjoyed were directly earned through their own efforts and labours.  The 
kings and courtiers were themselves traders of both land and seas.  They built their own ocean going 
ships.  Tommy Pires and van Leur described Malay ships of the 16th Century as reaching one hundred 
metres in length, the bulkwork reaching four metres above sea-surface and powered by six sails.  The 
bulkwork was double-hulled10. 
 Thirty years before the beginning of the Christian era, the Romans conquered Egypt, thus 
opening the Red Sea as a major link between Europe and the East.  More Malay ships began to converge 
to India which acted as an intermediary between the eastern world and Europe at that point of time.  
More Malay products flooded the Indian market.  Some Malay ships and traders even ventured to 
Persian and Arabic ports.  However, most of their direct trading contacts were with Indian Kingdoms 
situated in the eastern and southern parts of the sub-continent.  Malay rulers and the elites themselves 
were in direct contacts with the Indian members of their polities, thus becoming exposed to the high 
levels of Indian civilization.   
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 This active and direct involvement by the Malay elites was a result of the demand in sea 
commerce at that time.  These elites not only had to lead trade missions to Funan and India, but also to 
lead their own navies to provide security against rampant piracy.  They could not afford to enjoy 
sedentary lifestyles of agricultural elites in the later phase of their history, who only have to wait for 
incomes in palatial palaces.  The demandof sea commerce was indeed complex, both in the management 
of time and economic resources, producing constraints against leisurely lifestyle.  Thus no early Malay 
state or kingdom which was supported entirely by maritime-trading substructure, could have the time to 
build mega-palaces and temples and extol in high intellectual culture. 
 Another feature of these early maritime-trading kingdoms is that, they had many capitals.  
Langkasuka had Pattani and Bujang Valley as capitals while Tambralingga had Ligor and Chaiya at the 
Gulf of Siam, Krabi and Takkola at the Andaman Sea.  In times of war the kings could switch capitals 
accordingly to their convenience and strategies. 
 In time, the direct contacts with India particularly from 5th Century A.D, resulted in Indian 
cultural influence which began to peak over the next eight centuries.  Animism gave way to Hinduism as 
well as Buddhism, nearly completely.  Hindu Gods and Buddhist deities were worshipped.  However this 
process occurred selectively, where a few elements of Hindu religion and Buddhistic beliefs were not 
adopted.  Malay scholars flooded India’s centres of learning, such as Nalanda University to study 
Buddhism and Hinduism.  Malay capitals of Palembang and Jambi later became the centres of learning of 
these religions and philosophies.  A number of Chinese scholars began to converge to those Malay 
centres to familiarise themselves with the religions before proceeding to India for further studies.  
 In the 7th Century A.D, state-formation in the southern mandalas became complete by virtue 
of expansion of international maritime trade.  A kingdom called Srivijaya emerged from a mandala called 
Kuntala situated at the estuary of river Musi in Southeast Sumatra.  In the year 670 A.D, the Srivijayan 
king called Jayanasa enacted a neighbouring mandala,Malayu, which was situated at the mouth of 
Batang Hari river.  These events occurred in the wake of China’s demands for camphor and benzoic 
products which started to peak after Chinese scientists discovered their use in pharmaceuticals.  Chinese 
ships started to converge to the southern mandalas, bypassing Funan which later in the 6th Century 
began to fade.  At the same time the northern states of Tambralingga and Langkasuka began a slow 
decline. 
 The emerging direct trade with China, introduced to the Malay world a big eastern market 
for its products, no more being entirely dependent on western market centred in India.  State formation, 
took place and the emerging Srivijaya empire, through its immense riches from monopolistic trade with 
emperors of China began to subdue other states particularly Jayakartain Java under its wings.  This 
government-to-government monopolistic arrangement in maritime trade strengthened and enriched 
Srivijaya as well as the Chinese empire for at least four hundred years.  Palembang and Canton became 
primary ports of call for all ships to obtain goods from both empires. 
 The ingenuity of Malay emperors like Jayanasa, (670 A.D) centered in Palembang, 
Dharmasetu centered in Tambralingga, Sangramadhananjaya (792 A.D) also centered in Tambralingga, 
Samaratungga, (856 A.D) also in Tambralingga, in the management of the economy of the far-flung 




hold together a sea-dominated empire11 consisting scores of states through egalitarian policies was 
admirable.  The mechanism in managing resource exchange and market integration adopted by them 
need further detailed studies. 
 The enactment of adjacent mandala, Malayu, by Jayanasa in 670 A.D was also in response to 
the peaking of Chinese demand for a new product i.e gold, apart from demands for forest products.  The 
Musi river valley where Palembang, (which was the seat Jayanasa’s government), was situated, did not 
have any gold deposit.  Jambi which controlled Malayu, a successor of Kuntala, was located at the mouth 
of Batang Hari river, whose river valleys produced abundant gold deposits.  Thus the enactment of Jambi 
added a very highly demanded commodity in the world market, to the existing forest products controlled 
by Srivijaya.  
 Under Srivijaya, the Malay world became the centre-point and acted as the pivotal market of 
global trade.  Chinese ships, under government-to-government arrangement only stopped at Palembang 
and vice versa, where Malay ships only converged to Canton, creating two poles in global trade.  Indian 
and other western traders would converge to Palembang to get Chinese goods.  Thus Palembang 
became a world emporium, enriching the Malay emperors who used the riches wisely to hold together 
the scores of vassal kingdoms under their control.  The welfare of their citizen was well taken care of.  
Their navy consisting of Orang Laut was well endowed, hence Malay piracy was minimised.  Piracy was 
the monopoly of the Hakka Chinese and the Vietnamese during these times of economic growth in the 
Malay world.  This reality suggests that the distribution of wealth in the Malay world was more equitable 
than that in the Chinese empires.  Perhaps the popular social addressing of each other by the terms 
‘orang-kaya’ among the Malays of that time was a reflection of this state of affairs.  
 Under Srivijayan imperial arrangement, the vassal kingdoms were given freedom to collect 
local taxes and keep nearly all to themselves.  These extractive incomes were to be used to support the 
costs of governing the individual kingdoms.  They were not supposed to have direct tradings with 
international traders, which had to bypass their ports and converge to Palembang.  The Srivijayan navy 
would ensure this rule was followed.  This denial of direct participation in the international trade which 
was thriving, was compensated by the Srivijayan emperor to the vassal kingdom’s kings through the 
disbursement of annual dividends.  As long as this annual compensation was adequate, loyalties were 
maintained.  This symmetrical resource exchange structure was held together as long as the economic 
dividends and political protection from the centre were adequately disbursed.  
 During an auspicious month of each year, all the vassal kings would gather in Sabukingking12, 
the center of administration of the empire for an imperial pow-wow.  After forty days of meetings and 
merry makings, each king would return home bringing with him his body-weight of gold ; an annual 
dividend for being loyal to the empire.  In order to distribute enough dividends to satisfy the kingly 
needs, the emperor had to make sure that he had enough gold reserves in his treasury. 
 However, besides this materialistic means to gain loyalties, the emperor also devised some 
cultural instruments to achieve the same purpose.  Before each vassal king sailed home with his gold 
bullions he had to drink a cup of holy water poured on a sacred-stone with holy inscriptions, which was 
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supposed to integrate with the vassal king’s blood.  The sacred water would react to bring illness or even 
death if the king became disloyal, or derhaka. 
 The sacred stone was duly duplicated in far-flung vassal kingdoms such as Tambralingga, 
Pattani, Kedah, Bangka Island and other parts of the Malay world.   Thus elements of the new beliefs 
were used for the purpose of managing resource exchanges and market control and integration of the 
ancient Malay political-economy, based on egalitarianism.  It should be noted that during these early 
years, the emperors and the vassal kings did not have the time and luxury of hiring foreigners to manage 
their economies nor their spiritual lives.  The Brahmans who performed the religio-cultural rituals were 
the Malays themselves i.e those who went to India to study the religious philosophies and practices. 
 The periods between 7th and the 15th centuries (the Classical Period) saw the Malay leaders 
becoming more active in trading as well as empire-management activities.  They had no time to lead 
sedentary hedonistic lives, building palatial palaces for themselves.  However in order to strengthen their 
legitimacies as the representatives of the Hindu  gods, particularly Shiva and Vishnu as well as to show 
obedience to the great teacher, Gautama Buddha, they built great monuments like Prambanan temple 
and Borobodur complex in the Kedu Plains of Central Java13. 
 The contacts with India did not only bring economic benefits in maritime tradings and hence 
the economic growth and development of the Malay world but also some political ramifications.The 
divide between Hinduism and Buddhism also impacted trade and state formations that influenced the 
nature of Malay economics and politics throughout their history during the classical period.  In many 
instances, the Hindu/Buddhist divide erupted into wars.  The Kedu Plain in Java saw many wars between 
local Hindu kingdoms and Srivijayan vassals, the Sailendras, who were Buddhists.  Thus, Borobudor and 
Prambanan were built at the same time to project their separate legitimacies.  In Sumatra, the on-going 
battles between Hindu and Buddhist kings to control the pepper producing Kuntu Kampar and other 
Minangkabau kingdoms, occurred from the 7th until the 14th Centuries.  The Muslim dynasties of Aru and 
Aceh finally overpowered the kingdoms before Dutch influence penetrated these rich lands of pepper in 
the 17thCentury.  
 
iii. AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION – The Impact of Trade Rivalries on the Malay Political-
Economy 
 Ever since the Malay mandalas, and later the states, intensified their maritime tradings with 
Indian Kingdoms in the 5th Century A.D, they were confronted with intense rivalries between two guilds 
of Indian merchants.  The Hindu guilds controlled the earlier trade route between the northern Indian 
Ganga region and Funan through Takuapa and Tambralingga in the northern Malay peninsular.  Thus 
Funan became Hinduized.  Hindu merchants also controlled the Indian Ocean trade routes from India to 
Java through Barus in northwest Sumatra, down to Padang and Pariaman and finally to the kingdom of 
Java.  Whereas the Buddhist guildcontrolled the trade routes to the northern Sumatran Kingdoms of 
Samudra-Pasai, Aru, Perlak and Kedah down through Jambi and finally ended up in Palembang, Srivijaya.  
Thus all the above kingdoms adopted Buddhism. 
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 This situation was maintained before Jayanasa (670 A.D) began conquering neighbouring 
kingdoms, followed by Dharmasetu’s control of Central Java and Sangramadhanajaya’s (792 A.D – 825 
A.D) consolidation of the Srivijaya Empire by conquering Indrapura in Kampuchea.  At the same time 
Samudra-Pasai and all the other mandalas and kingdoms, including Kedah, fronting the Malay Lake 
(Straits of Malacca) came under Srivijaya’s influence.  Thus began an era of bitter rivalries and bloody 
feuds between the two religious based Indian guilds.  In the end the Buddhist guild dominated the Malay 
world’s maritime commerce.   
 The overpowering strength of Buddhist Srivijaya finally marginalized the Hindu guilds away 
from the new east-west trade route through the Malay Lake (Straits Of Malacca).  Chinese merchants 
mostly converged to Palembang, ignoring the Hinduized eastern Javanese kingdoms and ports of Japara, 
Kediri, Gerisik, Surabaya and Demak.  The Chinese who were mostly Buddhists were drawn into these 
religious rivalries.   
 The Chinese were mostly looking for gold and forest products such as camphor, cinnamon, 
benzoic as well as food additives like black pepper, cloves and nutmegs.  These food additives which 
grew in forests were easily domesticated.  The high fertility of volcanic soils of Hindu Java and Central 
Sumatra could readily be exploited to meet the growing demands from the big Chinese market.  
 The marginalized Hindu kingdoms of Central Java thus turned to the cultivation of rice and 
the growing of food additives, leaving the developed international maritime trade to Buddhist Srivijaya 
centred at the port of Jayakarta and Banten Girang in West Java.  Thus the opening of the vast fertile 
Kedu Plain in central Java for intensive agriculture began.  At the same time forest products were also 
collected from the eastern islands of Celebes, Maluku and Flores by Hindu ports of Japara and Surabaya.  
They were transhipped to Srivijaya-controlled Jayakarta. 
 It should be noted that, this response to the Chinese demand for food additives also occurred 
to a lesser extent in kingdoms controlled by Srivijaya.  Samudra-Pasai, the Minangkabau region, Aru and 
to a certain extent Jambi began to domesticate black pepper, cloves and nutmeg.  However their huge 
forest hinterlands presented a better comparative advantage in the hunting and collection of the forest 
products to be exported to China as well as India.  Cultivation of these products was thus not much 
favoured.  
 However, the process of agricultural involution from a very lucrative maritime trading did not 
represent a retrogressive development in the economy of the Malay world.  It was rather a 
complementary development where the agricultural products actually became commodities highly 
demanded by the world markets.  The agricultural products cultivated by the Hinduized kingdoms finally 
ended at the ports controlled by the Buddhist kingdoms under Srivijaya.  This complementarity was 
supposed to end rivalries and wars between the two groups.  However, this was not to be. 
 The Srivijayan emperors centered in Palembang could not resist the temptation to possess 
for themselves the enormous amount of rice coming to their ports from the fertile Kedu Plains of Central 
Java.  Hence they conquered the entire region setting up a dynasty called Sailendra surrounded by Hindu 
Kingdoms of East and Central Java.  Emperor Sangramadhananjaya planted Srivijaya’s legitimacy by 
building the famous Buddhist temple complex of Borobodur in the Kedu Plains in 792 A.D and this was 
completed by his descendant, emperor Samaratungga, in 825 A.D.  This act of physically instituting the 
legitimacy of Srivijaya rule was challenged by a nearby Hindu king, Garung, who built an impressive 




 The struggle for control of the fertile central Java Kedu Plain signalled the realization of the 
importance of agriculture among Srivijayan emperors who were once obsessed with the sea and the 
trade opportunities it provided.  The strategic importance of food security policy were to be realized by 
them when their international maritime trading activities were undermined by changes in the political 
and economic situations in countries of their major trading partners, particularly China.  It should be 
remembered that the wealth of Srivijaya came mainly from government to government trade monopoly 
with China.  There were periods in the history of this trading arrangement when turmoils and civil wars 
in China, entirely cut off trading activities.  Hence the treasury in Palembang was depleted from time to 
time, causing dissatisfaction among the vassal kings who used to get ample dividends at the annual pow-
wow during good times.  The threat of secession became real at times.  In the 11th Century, Kedah and 
Aru,rebelled sending armadas to raid Palembang when the annual dividends were not forthcoming.  It 
was during these periods rampant Malay piracy occurred.  When the Orang Laut navy was not well paid 
they turned to piracy, competing with the Chinese Hakkas lurking in the Malay Lake (Straits of Malacca).  
Although such rebellious acts were mostly put down, the policy of having a thriving domestic economy 
and food security became real. 
 The growth and development of the agricultural sector, however, generated a new societal 
development.  The primordial differentiated social structure of the Malays, instituted in states supported 
by maritime economic substructures, began to become more complex with the introduction of a 
lucrative agricultural sector. 
 Unlike the fluid and dynamic nature of international maritime trading, agriculture presented 
a sedentary and laid-back lifestyle.  The period between planting and harvesting in most crops was an 
idle phase of life.  A lot of time was spent in recreation and entertainment activities during these idle 
days, such as cock and bull-fightings, with their gambling ramifications, hunting and other hedonistic 
undertakings.  Leisure occupied half the cycle in padi planting sector alone.  However, the laid-back and 
leisure lifestyles provided the opportunity for intellectual and cultural growth and development.  Hence, 
literature proliferated accompanied by the arts, enriching the Malay culture as a whole. 
 Large surpluses of rice and other cultivated products were exported by the Hindu kingdoms 
of Java into the international markets.  Under pressure from Srivijaya, Hindu kings in Java moved east 
into agricultural regions abandoning most of their seaports to governors who came under Srivijayan 
influence.  Income from rice as well as cultivated spice sectors was lucrative enough for them to base 
their kingdoms only on agricultural substructures, away from the thriving sea-ports.  
 Political and social institutions were elaborately built upon mainly rice economy.  Laws and 
regulations on land-use and ownership were drawn.  The ruling bureaucracy was expanded to include 
minor officials to administer the economy at lower levels.  Taxes were imposed on exported agricultural 
goods and on land tilled by other people other than the king himself.  Thus state income burgeoned and 
the kings became very rich. 
 Riches and leisurely life encouraged the practice of farming out of major activities in the 
economy of the state.  Riches and leisurely life also prompted the kings to strengthen their political 
legitimacies using religio-cultural means of building temples, monuments and palatial palaces.  These 
physical symbols were supposed to impress their citizens of their semi-divine and supernatural powers 
and connections to the ethereal world, copying the Indian pantheon.  Farming-out taxcollections and 
distributing land concessions to foreigners enabled the kings and the elites to have more time for leisure.  




to move in to grab money-making opportunities as rent-seekers.  Through deceits and manipulations 
they managed to extract much of the bounties which were supposed to go to the state-treasury.   
 History has shown that many of these rent seekers managed to creep into the power circles 
of the Malay kingdoms, particularly holding the posts of syahbandar or in effect the ministers of finance 
endowed with the power of collecting taxes.  This development often sowed the seeds of palace 
intrigues when Malay elites felt that they were marginalized by the kings.  The fall of Malacca for 
instance was a result of such intrigues.  The demise of many kingdoms in Java and Sumatra during these 
periods of farming-out economic concessions was attributed to the palace intrigues and rebellions 
among the masses, led by the marginalized elites. 
iv.The Emerging Class of Rent-Seekers 
 While history always relates about the exploits of rent-seekers in agricultural based Malay 
kingdoms, it rarely tells about the existence of rent seekers in Malay maritime trading kingdoms with the 
exception of Malacca.  In these kingdoms, the kings themselves led trade missions and even captained 
the trading ships themselves.  If they chose not to sail, they would delegate the task of carrying their 
trade goods to members of the ruling elites. 
 But a different story occurred in most agricultural states. A number of foreigners, mostly 
Chinese and some Indians and Arabs were given concessions and tax-farms by the Malay kings of the 
agricultural based states.  This practice started in the thirteenth century and peaked in the fifteenth 
century particularly in Java, Acheh and Kedah14. 
 The major factor which prompted the kings to coopt foreigners to manage their economic 
interests might be the distrust they harboured towards their own people.  The fear of enriching and 
hence empowering their own people who later might wrest power from them, made them turn to 
foreigners whom they thought might not have the support of the people to turn against them.  However, 
this may not be always true in the history of the Malays.  One good example was the case of a Chinese-
Muslimrent-seeker in the person of Cek Kok Po whose Javanese name was Radin Patah. He became very 
rich,enmassing an army of 36,000 fighters, attacked the Majapahit Hindu king of Demak and captured his 
throne in the first quarter of the 16th Century.  Of course, being a Muslim, all the Malay, Indian, Arab and 
Persian Muslim merchants who boycotted Portuguese Malacca and converged to Japara, supported his 
adventures by providing financial and human resources.  From that time the entire Java began to be 
Islamised by his son, Radin Trenggana with the help of Muslim kings of Kediri and Gerisik and the holy 
man, Sunan Gunung Jati.  This may be a solitary incidence where a foreign rent-seeker dethroned a raja 
who previously did him a favor.   
 Of course, it was the factor of ukhuwah or Muslim brotherhood that allowed the 
concessionairee, Radin Patah, to get assistance from his Muslim brothers and hence to succeed in his 
exploits.  This religious based brotherhood is also seen to operate in the Philippines where Chinese rent-
seekers had to convert into Christianity in order to be given privilege which otherwise would be enjoyed 
only by the racist Spanish conquistadors.  These Christianised Chinese adopted Spanish customs and 
married locals to produce a class of hybrid race called mestizos or caciques who rule Philippines to this 
day.  Here again, the ukhuwah factor is seen to operate in political economy. 
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 The presence of Chinese in the Malay world predated all other foreigners.  They constituted a 
sizeable minority in Srivijayan ports of Palembang and Jambi even before Jayanasa enacted Jambi in 670 
A.D.  They were also present in the Hindu ports of Java.  Many more made their presence in the Malay 
world during the height of China trade in 8th Century to 15th Century A.D.  It was narrated in Sejarah 
Melayu that Admiral Cheng Ho himself brought a Chinese princess to be married to Sultan Mansor Shah 
of Malacca, in the middle of the 15th Century.  She was accompanied by 500 maidens. 
 Arab, Indian, Persian and Turkish merchants who were Muslims, easily assimilated into the 
Malay societies through ukhuwah and through marriages similar to the Chinese in the Philippines.  But 
this did not happen in case of the Chinese rent-seekers in other Malay states.  Cek Kok Po was an original 
Muslim from China and thus an exception.  Hence the ukhuwah or brotherhood factor did operate in 
some concessionary transaction with the Muslim Malay kings.  But the overarching factor that mediated 
the transaction was pure greed among the Malay kings and also their attitude of worshipping leisure plus 
the distrust of their own people. 
 The Chinese rent-seekers who made their fortunes in the Malay economies rarely exchanged 
favors obtained from the Malays with loyalties to the Malay polities when times to do so emerged.  
History often narrated that when Western colonial powers tried to wrest control of Malay trade, or for 
that matter the kingdoms, it was the Chinese rent-seekers who gave them assistance in the form of 
manpower, money and strategic intelligence.  The cases of the Dutch conquest of Jayakarta, the 
Portuguese conquest of Malacca and the Thai occupation of Kedah among others, illustrate the 
treacherous and ingrate roles of these rent-seekers15.  There was no such thing as humanistic dimension 
in their social relationship with other people.  The price they paid in the form of money or other kinds of 
payment were considered as the absolute resource exchange in their economic transaction, no more nor 
less.  
 The opulance and tasteful lifestyles of these rent-seekers superceded those of the Malay 
kings, their benefactors.  The new independent Malayan government in 1957 even saw it fit to purchase 
the palatial residence of a Chinese rent-seeker in Kuala Lumpur and converted it into a national palace 
for their paramount ruler.  The lifestyle of the Ooi family in Semarang who was given revenue farms and 
also acted as a drug lord (opium trader) in the second half of the 19th Century was very much the envy of 
the kratons in East Java.  And the opulance enjoyed by a wealthy Chinese revenue-farm owner who went 
by the Spanish-Chinese hybrid name Don Carlos Palanca Chen Quinshan inspired the Malay intellectual 
and independence fighter, Jose Rizal, to parodise his lifestyle in a famous novel, Fillibusterino. 
 Many of these rent-seekers earned most of their riches through the cultivation and control of 
opium trade in the 19th Century.  British and Dutch colonialists played the same shameful role as that the 
late Khun Sa, the modern world famous drug king from the Golden Triangle, by protectingthe opium 
traders and paid them to become carriers of opium to China and other Asian capitals.  Parts of the opium 
supplied by the British to the Chinese in Southern China originated from the Chinese rent seekers.  It was 
this trade that led to the opium war between the British and the Chinese emperor in the 19th Century.   
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v.The Coming of the Western Colonial Powers 
 The first Western traders to venture directly into the Malay world were the Portuguese and 
the Spanish starting in the middle of 15th Century.  These two groups came with dual objectives i.e to 
Christianise the Malays while trading for abundant spices and forest products of the archipelago.  The 
first objective was achieved in much of the Philippines and some part of Eastern Indonesia, after fierce 
resistance from local Muslim population.  This success was very much due to firepower, where able men 
were massacred while children were spared and women were forcibly married to the Spanish soldiers or 
even raped.  Proselytisation followed the genocidal pogrom.  
 The second objective, trade, failed miserably due to boycotts from Muslim traders and ports.  
A good example was the Portuguese failure to monopolise trade in the Straits of Malacca in 1511 after 
Muslim traders(Malays, Arabs, Indians, Persians, Turks) boycotted the ports and instead converged to 
Muslim ports of Acheh, Kedah, Palembang, Jambi, Japara, Banten Girang, Surabaya and Jayakarta.  The 
only traders left to trade with the Portuguese were the non-Muslims, particularly the Chinese and 
Indians.  At the same time the Portuguese were sequestered within their A Famosa, being regularly 
harassed by Malay forces from Acheh and Johor-Riau.  Portuguese occupation of Malacca was not a 
romantic phase of its imperial history, but rather a harrowing century of frustration and miseries.  As 
mentioned earlier, the Malay kingdom of Malacca did not die as a result of the Portuguese conquest.  
Only the capital moved to Muar, then to Kota Tinggi and finally to Kampar, Sumatra.  It is the nature of 
Malay governance that is inherited from the traditions of the Srivijayan empire.  Thus the Malays were 
still dominant in maritime trade until the 17th Century.  
 The coming of the Dutch in the 17th Century and later the British in the 18th Century were 
pivotal in the macro level changes in the political-economy of the Malay World.  Initially both western 
maritime traders only intended to trade, unlike the Spanish and Portuguese who wanted to conquer and 
proselytise as well.  The Dutch formed a public company called the VOC and the British formed a similar 
public equity company called the East India Company (EIC).  They initially intended to participate in the 
lucrative free market of the Malay World. 
 However, the goods they brought were of less valuecompared to the highly demanded, thus 
highly valued spices, metals, forest products of the Malay World.  After a period of money-losing 
ventures, the two public equity companies went bankrupt.  This prompted their respective governments 
to take over the companies.  The British and the Dutch governments realised that they would also lose 
money in the free market of the Malay World.  Therefore in order to make ends meet, high-handed 
mercantalistic strategies were implemented.  Gunships were deployed to force Malay kingdoms to trade 
with them.  The memories of institutionalized piracy, introduced by Sir Francis Drake, were recalled.  A 
good illustration was the incidence of Penang-based British interests, sending their gunships to force the 
Sultan of Kedah some time in the 19th Century to sell rice very cheaply16 to them after rice supply from 
Burma to their tin mines in Perak and Selangor, was cut off due to Thai-Burmese war.  Kedah’s initial 
refusal was a reaction to the British deceits, particularly paying only half of what was agreed upon, in the 
payment of rent for the use of Penang as a British port.  
 The same pattern of mercantilism was applied in Indonesia, particularly in Java, where Dutch 
deceits and firepower managed to extract huge bounties from the Malay economy.  The Spanish initially 
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did the same, but due to their successful proselytization over a period of time, the natives were 
acculturated and assimilated into their Iberian Christian culture and thus were subservient.Hence there 
was no need for strong-arm strategies.  Huge tracts of land were forcibly possessed by the Spanish 
conquistadors without any collective resistance from a population lacking in local leadership.  The 
Spanish were perceived to belong to a master race.  
 In all the three Malay countries the colonial governmental authorities initially were 
confronted with high maintenance budgets.  Much of the expenditures went to sustain a big security 
force (police and the military) to maintain law and order as well as to put down rebellions.  Thousands of 
locals (Christianized natives in Indonesia and Philippines) and imported mercenaries from India (Malaya) 
were recruited into the security forces.  Manpower to work in the plantations as well as in mines had to 
be imported for strategic reasons.  The Malays were either not interested or were barred into these 
sectors for fear of empowering them with riches and thus creating a class of new educated elites who 
would question the legitimacy of the colonials to rule their world. 
 The colonial governments realised that the high operating costs faced by their public equity 
companies (VOC and EIC) before, was one of the factors which led to their demise.  Hence they had to 
find a mechanism where these costs could be further minimised, thus making big profits from their 
imperialistic ventures in the Malay lands, thousands of miles away from home.   
 Over time they finally found the way i.e the practice of farming out of economic and business 
operations to the existing Chinese traders in the Malay World.  Thus concessions in the form of tax-
farms, production and market monopolies and strategic bureaucratic posts were handed to these 
Chinese traders.  After all this was the practice adopted by the Malay rajas and sultans who opted for 
leisurely lives, rather than immersing themselves in the drudgeries of managing agriculture and trade like 
their seafaring ancestors of yore.  They became preoccupied with the development of culture, like 
building monuments, temples, palaces and enjoying the hedonistic aspects of life like womanising, 
gambling and even drug-taking.  The colonialists encouraged these by introducing opium, and tobacco 
into the agricultural sector, often handing out large tracts of land to Chinese concessionairees in Java 
and Sumatra to produce these dangerous drugs.  Many rajas and sultans and members of the Malay 
polities were known to be opium addicts.  Thus while high on opium, they were easily deceived 
particularly in signing off ownership of lands in treaties which were one-sided, benefitting only the 
colonialists.  Not many studies are done to highlight this aspect of unethical and shameful strategies of 
the colonialists, or what may be termed as a benign institutionalisation of piracy or robbery.   
 The 19th Century Malay World saw a number of big Chinese concessionairees emerging as a 
result of the expansion of the farming-out policies adopted from the rajas and the sultans by the 
colonialists.  Many of them rose to become compradors of big colonial businesses, adopting colonial 
ways of life as well as the Malay sultan’s opulance.  Oei Tiong Ham of Semarang, Loke Yew of Kuala 
Lumpur and Carlos Palanca Chen Quinshan of Manila were the early Chinese comprador capitalists 
working for their colonial masters.  Most of their riches came from opium, coolie trafficking, gambling, 
and alcohol production.  They had close links with the Chinese secret society, the triad.  They were to be 
known as Chinese godfathers later. 
 These godfathers’ only loyalty is to money, not to anybody or anything else.  Their kinds 
would only side with a winning party as exemplified by many incidents in history.  Their switching of 
sides when Sultan Mahmud began losing his grips on Malacca in 1511 A.D after a four-month siege by 




and when Diponegoro was at war against the Dutch, all in the 19th Century illustrated that they were not 
permanent friends.   
 The British and the Dutch understood this very well and were quick to exploit it by cultivating 
and nurturing their roles in building a structure of economic dependency between the Malay World and 
their own capitals of London and Amsterdam.  The Spanish were more benign and happy with their 
success in Christianizing the Filipinos.  Manila became their permanent home.  They were after all 
perceived as the chosen people to bring the Holy Cross to the Philippines.  
vi.Dependency Economic Structures ------ Centre-Periphery Relationships 
 From the 19th Century to the first half of the 20th Century A.D, the colonialists (the Spanish, 
Dutch and British) enjoyed harvesting the riches of the Malay World using comprador capitalism to the 
maximum in order to maximise profits.  The three major Chinese compradors or godfathers mentioned 
earlier began to build their business empires around the middle of the 19th Century. 
 The roles of procuring primary commodities from the Malays at barrel-bottom prices were 
undertaken by comprador capitalists and their subsidiaries.  These commodities such as spices, other 
food items, tin, rubber, tobacco and forest products were mostly shipped to London and Amsterdam or 
to the British colony of Hong Kong to be processed.  The finished products were returned to the colonies 
leaving substantial added values to the mother countries’ economies.  Import taxes into the colonies 
were very low and in some cases none at all, thus pushing down prices and chasing away any potential 
local competition.  This policy discouraged any of the comprador capitalists to try processing these raw 
commodities in the colonies for fear of high commodity prices and high excise taxes imposed by the 
colonial governmentsto discourage competition with their imports.  Thus the colonies were deprived of 
any development of the secondary sector of their economies.  They remained as the suppliers of cheap 
raw materials to the industrialization process of the mother countries, depending on them for every 
modern finished economic goods and services. 
 The colonial economies thus became like planets circling the sun.  However this analogy 
stops there, where instead of the planets getting life giving rays of the sun, the reverse process occurred.  
Here most of the riches flowed to the mother countries (the sun) which acted as extracting centres, 
sucking most of the wealth of the peripheries, the colonies.  The primacy of these centers was sustained 
for nearly two centuries, enriching both Britain and Holland.  At the same time the Chinese godfathers 
were busy building up their business empires by diversifying their economic activities both in the 
colonies as well as overseas. 
 The colonial masters began to realize their impermanent tenure status in the middle of the 
twentieth century when agitation for independence started to emerge from the Malays.  Hence a 
scheme to perpetuate their economic control of the independent Malay countries of the future was 
promulgated.  The pivotal role of the Chinese comprador capitalists had to be ossified in the politically 
independent Malay World, in the seeming absence of the former colonialists who physically left in the 
middle of the 20th Century. Many of their Chinese compradors became their agents and were assisted in 
the form of financial capital supplied through agency houses and banks mostly situated in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Penang.  The business and economic primacy of London and Amsterdam were taken over 
by these three colonial administrative centres of the Malay World.  Thus the three cities became the 




days of their self-rules.  And in these three cities the economic interests of the former colonial masters 
were maintained through their comprador capitalists. 
 The Japanese victory and occupation in the Second World War (1941-1945) heightened the 
consciousness of Malay leaders on the economic dependency structures created by the British, Dutch 
and Spanish colonialists.  Efforts towards dismantling the structure were fiercely carried out in Indonesia 
and the Philippines by the new Malay leaderships.  Ordinary Chinese retail trades and the colonial 
masters’ business houses were nationalised.However, the big businesses of the comprador-capitalists 
were spared.  This was attributed to the switching of loyalties of the godfathers again, this time towards 
the Malay polities.  They bought favours by many means including all types of briberies.  Some of them 
even managed to creep into the new Malay cabinets, holding important posts of Ministers of finance. 
 In Malaya, the independent government adopted a more benign policy in which the sharing 
of an expanding wealth was favourably allocated to the Malay masses.  No nationalization act was ever 
implemented either on former colonial masters’ businesses nor those of the comprador capitalists.  The 
strategy was to increase the economic cake.  The Malay share will come from this increase, not touching 
those already possessed by the non-Malays. 
 The three Malay countries progressed through their self-rule histories in separate ways.  The 
seeds of dependency situation were still in their economic systems, but remained dormant in the early 
decades of self-rule waiting to sprout again when the ripe moment comes, i.e when new generations of 
leaders who would be very much influenced by capitalistic theories of growth, begin to take over. 
vii.Economic Nationalism and Indigenisation Efforts 
 Economic nationalism in the three Malay countries started to surface as far back as 1912 
when religious and nationalist leaders formed Sarikat Islam in Indonesia.  Haji Omar Tjokroaminoto led a 
number of intellectuals to check and stamp out economic exploitations of the ordinary people by 
Chinese businesses, particularly in the rural areas.  These businesses represented the long arm of 
Chinese rent-seekers such as Oei Tiong Ham and his successors who provided very high interest rates on 
production and consumption credits to poor peasants.  The high interest rates caused perpetual 
indebtedness among the peasantry, which was inherited by succeeding generations thus perpetuating 
the cycle of exploitation. 
 The same consciousness appeared among Malayan religious and nationalist elites in Malaysia 
and the natives in the Philippines a little bit later in the first quarter of the 20th Century.  The formation 
of the Sarikat Islam and other reactions against the exploitative ways of the Chinese business men in the 
Malay World mostly came in the form of cooperative-movement, an inclusive socioeconomic instrument 
in which members own the means of production and marketing.   
 This movement which started in Britain in the 19th Century as a response to capitalist 
exploitation in the wake of economic development brought about by the industrial revolution, was 
introduced to the Malay World by colonial administrators.  Through financial capital mobilization, funds 
were created as sources of production and consumption credit to the peasantry who would run their 
own farms or other enterprises.  This move was supposed to replace the credit lines provided by the 
Chinese capitalists with very high interest rates.  However, due to lack of knowledge in management as 
well as corrupt practices by cooperative leaders, the movement ran into difficulties and failed in its noble 




exploitative system persisted, not long after the colonial masters left.  The Chinese business men began 
to make comebacks, this time loyal to the Malay power holders.  
 The repercussion was a feeling of hatred towards Chinese businesses and anti-Chinese riots 
exploded all over Indonesia, especially in Java where the economic exploitations were mostly 
experienced by the peasantry.  In the Philippines Chinese business men were mostly protected by 
Christian brotherhood since most of the Chinese converted to Christianity and married locals.  However 
in these two Malay countries all Chinese businesses from the rural areas were expelled when 
independence was won from the colonial masters who protected the Chinese during their reign.  In 
Malaya, although most of the Chinese never converted to Islam, there had never been any anti-Chinese 
feelings which could lead to riots caused by economic displeasures among the Malays.  History has 
shown that the only anti-Chinese flare-up in Malaysia was caused by perceived threats to Malay political 
dominance after the General Election of 1969.   
 However, in all the three Malay countries, policies protecting the economic interests of the 
Malay native citizens were instituted.  Affirmative actions were taken to narrow the economic gaps 
between the Malays and the Chinese.  These measures could be construed as reactions towards the 
colonialist biases against the Malays while giving economic favours to the Chinese during decades of 
colonialism.    
 Cooperative movements in all the three Malay countries did not achieve a respectable 
success in replacing the Chinese middlemen who were at the same time the long-arms of comprador 
capitalists.  In rural Indonesia and Philippines the Chinese petty traders-cum-middlemen were chased 
out. Their functions to provide consumption and production credit could be fulfilled sufficiently by the 
cooperatives among the smallholders in the padi and rubber sectors, but not among the poor fishermen.  
The Chinese middlemen still were unable to be unseated, especially in the consumption credit needs, 
while waiting for catches to come to shore. 
 What the cooperative movements lacked in these Malay countries were skills in organization, 
management and accessibility to capital.  The realization about these shortcomings existed, but not 
seriously addressed before the 1970’s.  For two decades after independence, the cooperative movement 
remained in the romantic realm without the political will to routinize the spirits inspired by 
Tjokroaminoto, Rizal and Tun Abdul Razak. 
 However, the racial riot in Kuala Lumpur on 13th May 1969, catapulted Tun Abdul Razak to 
the forefront of power in Malaysia.  He immediately launched the rural cooperative movement pumping 
into the rural economy massive agricultural infrastructures, creditfacilities, while at the same time 
reforming the rural cooperative movement.  The Taiwanese model of farmers’ association was copied 
and administrated under a strong government organization called Farmers’ Organization Authority. 
 The reform which started in the padi-rice sector in early 1970’s was replicated in the rubber, 
oil palm and fishing sectors and progressed well into the late 1970’s, five years after Tun Abdul Razaks’ 
death.  Within less than a decade the rural cooperative movement was moving fast along its long journey 
to achieve the economic restructuring goal in the Malaysian society.  Even the non-agricultural 




towards a better future in the country’s mainstream economy.  They have achieved respectable goals 
bringing their members into the mainstream economy17.   
 The discovery and massive exploitation of petroleum reserves in the early 1980’s has injected 
substantial financial capital into the Malaysian economy.  In Indonesia this occurred earlier, while the 
Philippines was unfortunate not to have any commercially viable deposits to be exploited. 
 The sudden rush of petro-ringgit into the Malaysian economy which brought new wealth to 
the nation, rejuvenated the historical process of involution in governmental policies in which a grassroot 
movement to restructure the economy was again replaced with a system of farming out economic and 
business concessions to private entrepreneurs.  Joseph Stiglizt’s notion of private-enterprise led growth 
would be an important factor to achieve a developed-economy status was swallowed lock-stock by the 
polity.  Thus the dormant class of rent-seekers started to reappear.  
 Tun Abdul Razak’s grand plan to pull the masses to participate actively in the restructuring of 
the economy and society through the cooperative movement was thus replaced by a policy of doling out 
the new petro-ringgit wealth through the establishment of development funds.  The majority of these 
funds were mobilised from the masses.  These funds were supposed to increase the incomes of the 
masses without their active involvement. In cooperatives, active involvement of members is a necessary 
feature.  The professionally managed funds like those under the Permodalan Nasional Berhad, mobilize 
financial capital from the masses to be invested in the corporate sectors.  The investing public only have 
to wait passively to reap the annual dividends. 
 At the same time many big projects were farmed out to rent-seekers, the majority of whom 
were Chinese.  A sprinkle group of inexperienced Malay business executives was also given their 
opportunity to operate Joseph Stiglizt’s theory of private sector led growth and development of the 
economy.  Of course this strategy did in the initial stages proved the economist’s notion right, with the 
growths in GDPs reaching well above 7 % in the 1980’s.  But what happened in the later part of 1990’s 
and in the new millennium, the billions of ringgit harvested by the rent-seekers from the concessions 
were not reinvested in the national economy.  On top of that, further concessions were given through 
subsidies in production and marketing of their products.  Much of the profits raked by these rent seekers 
were channelled out into foreign economies. 
 The same pattern happened in Indonesia with extensive ramifications of bureaucratic 
corruptions.  The flow of wealthto the centres began unchecked.  Singapore, Hong Kong and Penang 
began to receive the Malay World’s riches just like what they experienced during the colonial days.  Even 
the old centres of London, Amsterdam are beginning to experience what their forefathers of yore did, 
when millions of concessionairees’ ringgit started to finance businesses ranging from drinking water 
production to football clubs.  Whether the returns from these investments would be brought back to 
Malaysia or not is another question.  Most probably they would not, judging by the remarks of the rent 
seeker who complained of cronyisms in Malaysia, while he himself is a crony.  He preferred to do 
business in the United Kingdom.  
 The Asian financial crisis at the end of last millennium followed by stagnation in export 
market brought dire consequences to the economies of the Malay World.  GDP growth started to 
plummet to rates unthought off in the early days of petro-ringgit wealth.  The 7 % GDP is no more 
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achievable in Malaysia in the near future, and hence the goal of a developed economy for Malaysia in 
2020 is in jeopardy.   
 What is more important, despite the wealth brought about by the petro-ringgit for the last 
three decades, the Gini-Coefficientshover around 0.44 and now it settles at 0.431 indicating that much of 
the wealth from economic growth are enjoyed by the top few percentages of the population.  Of course 
the rent-seekers are the major benefactors of the wealth raked in the Malay World.  Most of these 
wealth are transferred to and kept in offshore centres.  The Malay World retains its position in the 
peripheries.  Thus history repeats itself. 
 In the old days when such development occurred, the masses turned to banditry and piracy.  
However, in these modern times, the masses who finally realize this non-symmetrical resource exchange 
structure would use the ballot boxes to express their feelings and hope for a more equitable distribution 
of wealth.  As always it is the Malay polities who face the wrath of the masses, while the fleet footed 
rent seekers would flee to the safety of Singapore, London and Hong Kong.   
 
viii.Conclusion 
 History repeats itself.  The tendency towards a leisurely and sedentary lifestyle among the 
traditional members of the Malay polity during historical times of abundance, introduced into the 
traditional Malay economy an intermediate element.  This intermediary comes in the person of a foreign 
entrepreneur who gets a commission for the doing the work of a member of the polity or even for the 
entire state itself.  Usually the commission is very hefty resulting in the economic status of the 
intermediary to be able to wield powerful political and social influence on the state.  And these 
intermediaries were mostly Chinese who were also known as rent-seekers, or Chu Kongs.   
 Through close friendship, favors, briberies, persuasion or even blackmails, these rent-seekers 
were able to enter the traditional Malay economic system forming a functional appendage to the Malay 
economy as a whole.  However this functionality only operates purely in the running of the overall 
economic system, benefitting only the polity.  It spells doom to the ordinary citizens who had to bear the 
extra costs of exploitative ways the intermediaries operated their businesses.  Of course, the members 
of the polity who patronise these intermediaries benefitted tremendously from the rentals.  Thus they 
continued enjoying the leisure lifestyles, financed by these incomes at the expense of the citizens. 
 The coming of western colonial powers, particularly the British, Dutch and Spanish saw the 
proliferation of this comprador-capitalistic structure in the Malay economy.  The colonialists 
consequently copied and expanded the system to suit their needs.  The rent-seekers turned away from 
the Malay polity and instead started to work for the new power holders, the colonialists.  These rent-
seekers were too happy to serve the colonial masters who controlled a bigger market network than the 
Malay polity of yore.  Thus they formed a functional element of colonial rule who used them to bring in 
immigrants to work in mines and plantations.  This was a political grand plan, especially in British Malaya, 
to keep the Malays out of the mainstream economy, for fear of empowering them economically and 
hence planting the seeds of independence-consciousness.  The British understood the ramifications of 
the political-economy philosophy very well.  They also understood the central Malay value of 
egalitarianism which moulded this race not to be greedy in material needs.  They cultivated this value 
further, especially among the members of the Malay polity.  The Dutch were too greedy to exploit the 




from the Malays.  Whereas the Spanish were content with their success in Christianizing the Malays, thus 
a benign situation was maintained over centuries, until a few Malay intellectuals trained by them began 
asking questions on their legitimacy.   
 The lack of greed among the Malays should be fertile ground for further development and 
growth of the cooperative movement,a panacea for economic justice, which was neglected for more 
than two decades after the death of Tun Abdul Razak.  The patronising ways of running development 
funds for the citizens however have brought financial benefits to them so far.  But involving them in 
cooperative movements would create a participatory structure for full democracy in economy and 
politics.  The billions of ringgits worth of concessions given to the individual rent-seekers with added 
subsidised costs of operations, would go a long way to lower the Gini Coefficient if instead they are 
channelled to peoples’ cooperatives.  Let the high cultured lifestyles of the elites such as patronising the 
subsidised philharmonic orchestra, formula one car races, be supported by contributions from peoples’ 
cooperatives rather than be subsidised by concessionairees who look low on the ordinary folks.  Decision 
makers must read more history i.e the big history or the history of the people as a whole, not the history 
of kings and anointed leaders.   
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